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Abstract
We compare and contrast the basic principles of two philosophies:
Bayesianism and relationalism. These two philosophies are both based
upon criteria of rationality. The analogy invoked in such a comparison
seems rather apt when discussing tentative proofs of quantum nonlocal-
ity. We argue that Bayesianism is almost to quantum theory, what general
covariance is to general relativity. This is because the Bayesian interpre-
tation of quantum theory can be given a relational flavour.
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Introduction
In the following paper we suggest a curious analogy between two philosophies:
relationalism and Bayesianism. Basically there seems to be na¨ıve connection be-
tween these two philosophies because the main principles have a similar wording.
It is obviously rather facetious just to equate the two philosophies for such a
reason but, in the following, we wish to discuss where the analogy succeeds and
where it fails.
According to Leibniz, a relational philosophy has to obey two principles of
rationality (see [1] for and accessible introduction). Firstly we have the principle
of sufficient reason which means that there must be a rational reason for invoking
any feature of the theory. This principle is intimately connected with the second;
namely, the principle of identifying the indiscernible which states that if you
have no rational reason to distinguish features of the theory you should identify
them. For example, in a relational theory of spacetime there is no discernable
way to differentiate spacetimes which are shifted to the left by a certain amount,
thus we identify all spacetimes that are related by such transformations.
Bayesian probability [2] has recently been invoked in a lot of physics circles.
Arguably, the basic principle of Bayesian probability theory is the principle of
insufficient reason which states that if you cannot rationally prefer one of two
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propositions above the other you should assign them equal probabilities. If you
can rationally promote one proposition of the two then you should assign them
probabilities according to certain other rules that ensure they obey criteria of
rationality i.e. Cox’s axioms of probability [3]. It is perhaps quite facetious
to attempt to identify these two philosophies, but there is certainly a curious
analogy between the two. One might argue that the reason we assign the same
probability to the faces of a fair die is because by believing it is fair, and given
a sufficiently ‘good’ randomising tossing procedure, we have no way to discern
which face will come up top.
So the major principles of Bayesianism and relationalism are constraints due
to rationality. The question we wish to ask is whether there is anything to this
curious analogy, or whether it is just a meaningless correlation in words. The
major reason we want to ask this question is because in searching for a quantum
gravity theory we would like to keep the relationalism of general relativity and
the probabilistic aspects of quantum theory (which, arguably, can be interpreted
in a Bayesian manner [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]).
There are a few recent papers that hint about a relationship between these
two philosophies [9, 10, 11]. In [9] Caticha attempts to justify the thesis that a
lot of the geometrical features of general relativity theories can be derived simply
through a Bayesian theory of statistical inference. In [10] Poulin shows that the
Bayesian interpretation of states is compatible with a variety of relationalism
which then can be used to derive objects akin to spin-foams simply from a
relational invocation of quantum theory. In [11] Bosse and Hartle discuss an
attempt towards a covariant notion of a sum-over-histories interpretation which
may also be interpreted in a rather Bayesian manner.
So, let us briefly introduce Bayesianism in a bit more detail to see if we can
tease out any features of our tentative analogy between these two philosophies.
Bayesianism is a way of invoking, and deriving, a notion of probability simply
from criteria of rationality. In the standard analysis one can presume that the
algebra of propositions has a Boolean structure and then invoke certain axioms
that a rational notion of probabilistic inference should obey. Using these axioms
one can derive the standard notions of probability and, furthermore, one can also
derive relative frequencies with added assumptions also. When, upon a given
hypothesis, one does have a rational reason for interpreting one proposition as
more probable than another then one should assign probabilities that reflect
such a fact in a rational manner. When we say ‘rational’ we simply mean that
one should assign them in such a way that we do not disobey certain criteria
that our assignment should obey to be consistent. Firstly we should presume
that the probability we assign to the negation of a proposition upon a given
hypothesis should only be a function of the probability of that proposition upon
the same hypothesis. This is Cox’s first axiom of probability and can be written
schematically as:
p(¬α|I) := G[p(α|I)] (1)
where G is an arbitrary function to be determined that is sufficiently well-
behaved for our purposes and I is the symbol we use for a hypothesis. One
can interpret this is a relational manner. One does not wish to invoke any
functional relations between probabilities that we cannot justify. Our hypothesis
I should incorporate sufficient information for us to assign probabilities. Of
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course this hypothesis could be false but we do not assign probabilities upon
the presumption that it is false. We assign probabilities upon the presumption
that it is true. If (1) were not obeyed by a probability assignment then we would
effectively be presuming that I is not a good hypothesis, but we must assign
probabilities by presuming it is a good hypothesis—otherwise what is the point?
If it is a bad hypothesis then we will infer probabilities that are inconsistent with
what we observe and we may learn something from such a situation and assign
new probabilities upon a new better ‘good’ hypothesis [2].
Similarly Cox’s second axiom is a principle of rationality for similar reasons:
p(α ∩ β|I) := F [p(α|βI), p(β|I)]. (2)
We cannot justify any further functional relations between probabilities as
these two axioms are sufficient to prove how probabilities should behave when
using the ∪ operation. From these two axioms and the presumption that prob-
ability assignments should be real (for arguments against this presumption see
[4]) we can easily derive the basic rules of probability theory: probabilities obey
Bayes’ rule, and disjoint propositions have additive probabilities [3]. These,
however, are rules about manipulating probabilities; they often do not con-
strain exactly what value we should assign as a probability. For that we often
need the principle of insufficient reason: when, through our hypothesis, we have
no rational reason to discern certain propositions we should assign them equal
probabilities.
Thus one difference between the Bayesian principle of insufficient reason and
the relational principle of identifying the indiscernible is the indirect nature of
the Bayesian principle. The principle of insufficient reason is about identifying
the probabilities of propositions rather than the propositions themselves. The
principle of identifying the indiscernible is about treating propositions as equal
rather than their probabilities. Both principles are about not making any infer-
ence, or not justifying any result, based upon any spurious distinction between
equals. So we choose to have a background independent theory of gravity simply
because we do not want our results to depend upon the vagaries of a background
that we happen to choose. Thus background independence is only a physical
postulate in the sense that our physics should be rational.
One interesting distinction that must be made in relational theories of gravity
is the distinction between active and passive diffeomorphisms [12]. One chooses
to invoke a generally covariant theory because such a theory ‘adds the least’ to
the catalogue of spacetime coincidences—it is explicitly a criteria of rationality.
But general covariance in the passive sense is just a mathematical property of
certain theories, whereas it is the active general covariance that is meaningful
physically through the above criteria of rationality.
So, we identify probabilities if we do not want our inferences to spuriously de-
pend upon the fact we distinguish probabilistically propositions that we should
not rationally. We identify backgrounds if we cannot rationally justify one over
the other so that any result we derive does not depend upon the vagaries of
one particular background. Of course, in the future, if we were to ever be able
to distinguish one background over another we would change this assumption.
Similarly if we substitute one hypothesis for another our use of the principle of
insufficient reason may change. So both are principles of rationality ensuring
that any physical/probable inferences we make are rationally justified—such
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inference is only as good as the original hypothesis.
Should acknowledging such a similarity between these two philosophies help
in searching for a theory of quantum gravity? Einstein’s relational theory of
gravity only involves inferences that are independent of any background space-
time we invoke. The Bayesian theory of probability involves probabilistic infer-
ences. So perhaps the task of a quantum gravity theory is to find a theory in
which we have probabilistic inference and background independent inference in
the same theory. Easily said, but not so easily done.
We are heartened by Hardy’s recent ‘causaloid’ work [13], which suggests
that such a combination of such philosophies may indeed be possible (although
it is still a long way off). Hardy’s work is quasi-operational (he invokes opera-
tionalism for practical reasons rather than necessarily accepting it as a philoso-
phy) and invokes an operational notion of space-time that involves regions and
actions upon these regions. Such regions and actions are invoked using ‘cards’
of data which are implicitly Boolean in nature (cf. Bohr’s philosophy and Ein-
stein’s notion of spacetime coincidence) and are combined in standard Boolean
ways which suggests that Cox’s proofs can be passed across and that one can
invoke Bayes’ rule (which Hardy does). Hardy’s formalism already incorporates
quantum theory, should be able to incorporate general relativity, and tentatively
should be able to incorporate a quantum gravity theory also.
How might we go about searching for such a relational quantum theory
(also see [14, 15] for such relational ideas)? In acknowledging the distinction
between the two philosophies it seems we should first invoke a background in-
dependent set of propositions, and then use Bayesian reasoning to assign prob-
abilities to such propositions. Bayesianism should only be invoked once we
have already identified the indiscernible—we must identify indiscernible propo-
sitions and then identify probabilistically those discernable propositions we can-
not differentiate inferentially using a Bayesian hypothesis (and quantitatively
differentiate—using a probability—those propositions we feel we can upon our
hypothesis). Obviously it is pure speculation to suggest that Bayesian reason-
ing is totally sufficient in itself to assign probabilities in this manner, but it can
surely take us some of the way.
Bayesian probabilities may be useful in discussions of the histories propo-
sitional algebra [4, 5] which is at least a small step towards such a general-
isation. In the case of the HPO history propositional algebra [16], Bayesian
probabilities seem to appear quite naturally. It is clear that von Neumann mea-
surements are compatible with Bayesian probabilities but there is no a priori
reason why the history algebra should be compatible with Bayesian probabili-
ties. That there exist Bayesian assignments (linearly positive probabilities [17]
and complex probabilities [4]) consistent with the HPO algebra is a surprising
and suggestive result, especially since histories are often invoked as a small step
towards a quantum gravity theory.
Why Use Bayesian Probability?
If we are to invoke the above reasoning in any search for a quantum gravity
theory it is prudent to explicitly place quantum theory in a Bayesian framework.
There are very good reasons for doing so even regardless of the above argument,
and in this section we wish to outline a couple of said reasons. It is clear that the
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measurement problem is nullified in a Bayesian framework because assignments
are necessarily things that we assign. Another problem that seems to be nullified
is quantum nonlocality.
It is often stated that EPR and Bell-like theorems are avoided (not disproved
but just avoided) by using Bayesian probability theory (this is often the major
reason people invoke Bayesian reasoning in quantum theory [6]), but rarely
is it explicitly stated how the invocation of Bayesian probabilities overcomes
arguments for causal nonlocalities. We shall attempt to argue why this is the
case and why arguments that claim the opposite are lacking.
Bell proved that no hidden variable model (that obeys intuitive assumptions)
can be used to emulate the correlations we find in certain correlated quantum
systems [18]. If we postulate variables that pre-exist measurement that aren’t
effected by measurement or actions happening at spacelike separation then we
can’t use such theories to emulate quantum theory. This is why many refer to an
implicit ‘nonlocality’ in quantum theory. To put it another way, he proved that
quantum theory cannot be completed by using such hidden variables. One can
also validly argue that Bell proved that quantum theory itself cannot obey those
same intuitive assumptions regardless of hidden variables, so it either embodies
causal nonlocalities or is not a hidden variable completion of itself. This is a
result that goes against all our na¨ıve assumptions about how the world works—a
paradigm shifting body of work.
Of course, it is commonly accepted that Bell’s analysis doesn’t prove that
quantum theory necessarily embodies causal nonlocalities because it is not nec-
essarily claimed that quantum theory is its own hidden variable completion.
This is easily seen by analysing the assumptions that Bell—happily acknowl-
edging that one might make other assumptions—made. The major assumption
that Bell invoked is that the joint probabilities of outcomes at spacelike separa-
tion factorise in a certain way. Namely, if we have two measurement parameters
labelled a and b, with outcomes A and B respectively, that are chosen at space-
like separation, then Bell assumes the following:
p(AB|abλ) = p(A|aλ)p(B|bλ) (3)
where λ are the hidden variables that we mentioned. Bell called this factorisa-
tion assumption ‘local causality’.
Jarrett [19] showed that this factorisation assumption can be split up into
two logically distinct assumptions which, when take together, imply Eq. (3).
These two assumptions are, as named by Shimony [20], parameter independence
and outcome independence. Shimony showed that quantum theory itself obeys
parameter independence, namely:
p(A|abI) = p(A|aI). (4)
Here, I represents all other information we have about the set-up including any
hidden variables we invoke. This means that, in quantum theory, the probabil-
ity that one predicts for an event A in one spacetime region does not change
when the parameter b chosen in measuring an entangled subsystem elsewhere
is known. Knowledge of b doesn’t help in predicting anything about A. But
quantum theory does not obey outcome independence, namely:
p(A|BabI) 6= p(A|abI). (5)
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Knowledge of B can and does affect the predictions one makes about A. Thus,
Bell’s theorem proves that no parameter independent hidden variable theory
that is also outcome independent can be used to emulate the correlations we
get in quantum theory. Of course, it is natural to assume outcome indepen-
dence for hidden variable theories with no common causes. Thus Bell made
this assumption and proved his wonderfully iconic theorem that has now been
experimentally verified over and over again.
Using notions of Bayesian theory [2] we can show concisely and explicitly
why the presumption that quantum theory is its own hidden variable comple-
tion is not valid (thus blocking any proof that quantum theory, rather than its
tentative completions, is a nonlocal theory). Below we will look at a simple
experiment—not intended as an emulation of quantum theory—which is out-
come dependent and which cannot be described as a complete hidden variable
model due to a physical constraint upon what we are allowed to say about the
variables involved (in a manner akin to the toy model in [21]). Since such a
constraint is justified physically we call such a model ‘complete’—it is the best
theory we can rationally make of the physics. We cannot complete the model
further, in any manner akin to Bell’s hidden variables, not because such vari-
ables would be non-local, but because it is inconsistent, or at least unjustified,
physically to do so in the first place.
So, take an urn which is half-full of blue balls and half-full of red balls.
This urn is split into two sub-urns which each contain half the total number
of balls in the original urn. The selection process which chooses which balls to
put in which sub-urn is independent of the colour of the balls. Thus if we take
one ball out of a sub-urn and note that it is a red ball it is clear that, due to
the finite number of balls, the probability we now predict (given that further
information) of another observer taking a red-ball from the other sub-urn—upon
his first dip into the other sub-urn—is diminished. This classical result is true
regardless of the possible spacelike separation between the sub-urns. When the
other observer and ourselves are spacelike separated then the predictions that
the other observer makes will be unchanged by our action because he cannot
receive any information from us due to special relativistic considerations, but,
still, such an experiment is outcome dependent. Everyone must surely agree that
all mechanisms involved here are locally-causal and yet the two sub-urns form an
outcome dependent experiment. It is clear that we don’t propose a mechanical
effect between the two sub-urns. Nor would anyone claim that the reality of the
balls we use is in doubt; we only doubt that we can know the configuration of the
sub-urns without changing the nature of the experiment (making the sub-urns
transparent say)—presuming that we do know the contents of the sub-urns but
are ignoring them is not a valid assumption because, by the very nature of the
experiment, we do not know the contents of the sub-urns—some other demon
observer who is actually in the sub-urns might know the correct configuration,
but we certainly do not (we quantify our ignorance not their’s). Rationally, we
should differentiate the invocation of demon observers from the invocation of a
single no-nonsense observer. If we were to introduce two more properties, say
a magnetic or non-magnetic property of the balls then, observers of the two
sub-urns could freely decide whether to measure colour or magnetic properties
of balls they pick out, but still we could get some form of outcome dependence.
Of course, in Bell’s argument, the whole point of presuming outcome in-
dependence is because in presuming hidden variables (or equivalently demon
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observers) these hidden variables should complete our notion of state such that
the probabilities do factorise in the manner that Bell invokes. Let us state
clearly that we do not have any issue at all with Bell’s proof—we take it as
utterly incontrovertible. Bell’s proof shows that such completions do not give
a philosophically appealing theory—they are nonlocal. One might attempt to
argue that because quantum probabilities do not obey outcome independence
even regardless of appended hidden variables, then it must embody such causal
nonlocalities. This argument, however, does not follow through, because we do
not presume that the variables involved (a, b, A,B) are hidden variables that
complete quantum theory. As soon as one interprets probabilities using an ig-
norance interpretation then it is clear that outcome dependence is a possibility
in exactly the manner akin to our two-sub-urns experiment. As such, we do not
have any qualms as of yet about nonlocality in quantum theory. We shall discuss
Bell-like theorems which do not use probabilistic assumptions later; but first let
us carefully discuss why using an ignorance interpretation of probabilities in
quantum theory is useful.
Consider the analogy with general covariance. We invoke general covariance
because we do not want our inferences to depend upon the vagaries of a back-
ground spacetime that we happen to choose. Similarly we invoke Bayesian prob-
ability because we do not want our inferences (rather than a demon observer’s)
to depend upon the vagaries of a particular average over hidden configurations
that we might presume to be the case. Therefore we would rather call quantum
theory ‘complete’ than ‘incomplete’. It is as complete as any rational notion
can be. Just as a background would complete a background independent the-
ory, so would a hidden variable theory complete quantum mechanics. However,
a background independent theory is more physically appealing than any tenta-
tive not-rationally-justified completion. We argue for an analogous account for
hidden variable completions of quantum theory. When we wish to differentiate
Bell’s use of the word complete from ours we shall write our notion of ‘complete’
within scare quotes.
Of course, outcome dependence or independence in quantum theory is de-
fined with respect to the whole state of the system and apparatus. But, for
example, the state that we assign to the system and apparatus in our Bayesian
two-sub-urns example cannot include a specification of the numbers of each
colour in each half-urn because we do not know such a specification. How-
ever, as soon as we begin to accept that the state we assign to the system plus
apparatus does not, even implicitly, contain such a specification hidden from
us (why should it because we don’t know the specification and don’t, and ar-
guably shouldn’t, build it into the theory because it is a rational theory of our
ignorance) then we can still call the state ‘complete’ in a limited sense. The
specification of the contents of the sub-urns is unknown. A ‘complete’ state of
the system and apparatus should acknowledge this fact. It happens to be the
case that in our Bayesian two-sub-urns example that our prior-knowledge of the
set-up allows us to design a hidden variable theory because, relative to the prob-
abilistic state we assign the system plus apparatus, there is only one possible
list of counterfactually possible configurations. There is no a priori reason this
should be the case; equivalence between ignorance theories and hidden variable
theories might happen to be so in certain theories but we have no reason to
assume it is the case. In quantum theory it is explicitly not the case because
our prior-knowledge of the system and apparatus is not sufficient for us to infer
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a unique hidden variable theory.
So, one likes to assume that some other demon observer knowing the real
‘hidden’ configuration of the sub-urns does not affect the predictions we make
regarding the system and apparatus based upon the fact that we do not know
the hidden configuration of the sub-urns. This we do not argue against. Of
course, knowing the hidden configuration (or outcomes in certain arms of the
experiment) does mean that the demon’s probabilistic predictions regarding the
system and apparatus are manifestly different from ours.
Say we have a demon observer who knows a particular configuration is cor-
rect. Equally, probabilistically speaking, the configuration could have been
different (there are many hidden configurations that are possible for a given
state assigned by an observer who doesn’t know the hidden configuration—who
is ignorant of it). We can then tentatively list the set of all counterfactually
distinct possible configurations, each of which is known by a counterfactually
distinct demon observer. Normally ignorance is associated with an ignorance
as to what counterfactually distinct possibility is actually the case. But, why
should we presume that such a set of counterfactually distinct demon observers
who each know one of the possible hidden configurations is operationally equiv-
alent to one observer who does not know the configuration? What justifies such
an assumption? Knowing the hidden configuration changes one’s predictions.
Demon observers who know the configuration will predict different probabilities
for future (or past) events in comparison to an observer who does not know the
configuration (it is ‘hidden’ from her). So why presume that a list of demon
observers who each predict different things to the ignorant observer is opera-
tionally equivalent to the ignorant observer? This is an assumption that has
not been rationally or operationally justified. It is implicitly assumed in the
normal ensemble interpretation of probabilities.
Knowledge changes one’s predictions. It is only in ignorance that one main-
tains all one’s predictions. There is no rational reason to equate ignorance with
the set of all counterfactually possible cases of non-ignorance. Thus there are
distinct ways that we can interpret ignorance. To distinguish such interpre-
tations we shall call the unknown configuration (naturally, being a realist, we
presume that such a configuration is the case, we just cannot justify represent-
ing it in a theory of our ignorance) presumed but not modelled by an ignorant
observer simply the ‘unknown configuration’, and we shall call a configuration
that is known by some other demon observer a ‘hidden configuration’ (it is hid-
den relative to an ignorant observer). Bell proved that we cannot presume a
hidden configuration in quantum theory without also having to acknowledge
some form of nonlocality. His proof, of course, does not apply to an unknown
configuration—the proof does not follow through except for the hidden config-
urations which Bell considered. So one might argue against the pedagogical use
of demon observers rather than argue for nonlocality in quantum theory. In the
least, we shall learn something in the process of attempting such a task.
Is there an implicit problem in invoking a list of counterfactually distinct
demon observers? Demon observers are simply not operationally justified, just
as a particular background spacetime is not operationally justified. Perhaps
we can presume that we could have known the ‘real’ configuration, but we
certainly cannot presume that we do know the ‘real’ configuration because we
are presuming ignorance. Should we instead use the standard Bayesian notion
of ignorance, based on the ignorance of a single observer? In the standard
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Bayesian notion, an observer’s ignorance affects the probabilities he assigns.
His assignments are explicitly not effected by, and rationally should not depend
upon, the probabilities that other uncommunicative observers assign. When we
use such an ignorance interpretation we are allowed outcome dependence in such
a manner that it does not necessarily conflict with special relativity just as we are
allowed outcome dependence in an ignorance interpretation of the two-sub-urns
experiment. The thesis that using Bayesian reasoning in Bell’s analysis nullifies
any proof that quantum mechanics (rather than quantum mechanics appended
with hidden configurations) embodies causal nonlocalities is commonly hinted at
in the literature (it is often invoked as a reason for choosing to interpret quantum
probabilities in such a manner), but rarely is is it expressed explicitly. Bell’s
theorem tells us that either quantum theory is nonlocal or it (rather than its
tentative completions) is a theory which we are not justified in calling a hidden
variable theory. Clearly the latter proposal is far less drastic than the former
because we can interpret quantum theory as a theory of quantified ignorance.
Of course, we have taken liberties with our use of the term ‘ignorant’. An
observer who assigns a state to a system plus apparatus in quantum theory is
really not that ignorant at all. He can predict probabilities for any von Neu-
mann measurement (or POVM) he would like to make. His inferences, which
he quantifies using probabilities, may, of course, be wrong. When using the
term ignorant above we obviously only mean that he is comparatively ignorant
in comparison to a postulated demon observer who does know the hidden con-
figuration. So, we can postulate demon observers and equate ignorance with a
lack of knowledge as to which demon is correct. Then, according to Bell, we get
nonlocality. Clearly a meta-demon who is ignorant of which demon minion is
correct knows a lot more than we do—he knows which list of counterfactually
possible configurations to use and what prior-probabilities to assign them. In
quantum theory, we simply do not. It is clear that in quantum theory we can
imagine many different lists of counterfactually distinct hidden configurations—
there are many hidden variable theories. Why rationally choose one over the
other?
The nice property of the Bayesian interpretation of ignorance is that it is,
perhaps ironically, not particularly cyclical in its reasoning. We model an igno-
rant observer’s probability assignments using the standard criteria of rationality:
the principle of insufficient reason. If, however, we model ignorance as the igno-
rance of a meta-demon observer who is unclear as to which of his demon minions
is correct then we need lots of prior notions of probability. The Bayesian no-
tion is easy to understand and does not add any spurious assumptions to the
theory—it is a criteria of rationality just as general covariance is; it is also as
physical an assumption as general covariance is. Such a model would only be
‘complete’ in the sense that we do not invoke anything we are not rationally
compelled to. No further completion is rationally justified. Each and every
background dependent theory being irrationally justified does not mean that a
background independent theory is irrational—quite the opposite, a background
independent theory is clearly not the sum total of all background dependent
theories. Similarly with hidden variable theories and a Bayesian interpretation
of quantum mechanics. It is comonly accepted that some hidden variable theo-
ries require a special foliation or frame of reference, so the analogy may not be
as off-the-mark as one might initially consider it. So—we intend this only half-
seriously—perhaps Bayesian quantum theory is already a partially background
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independent theory (or at least should accommodate one to some extent).
Thus outcome dependence does not necessarily prove anything about non-
local causality. The colour of each ball, or the contents of each sub-urn, is not
necessarily a hidden (what we might rather call a known-but-ignored) variable
per se, but rather, we argue, it is an unknown variable. We quantify how un-
known it is by a probability. (We do not use probability to quantify how known
something is to some postulated other demon observer, we use it to quantify
how known something is to us.) This does not nullify Bell’s proof, but rather it
nullifies any suggestion that quantum theory is itself a hidden variable theory
upon which we can apply Bell’s proof. Ignorance, in the Bayesian interpretation,
is not about meta-demons, it is about a standard no-nonsense observer. Even
though our two-sub-urns experiment can be given a hidden variable formulation,
interpreting it in a Bayesian fashion removes the justification for doing so in the
first place. If one doesn’t like the cyclical nature of invoking prior-probabilities
and demons to define probabilities in quantum theory then don’t use them; use
Bayesian principles.
It is perhaps rather ironic that we have had to invoke an interpretation of
probability based around ‘ignorance’ in order to discuss the tentative ‘complete-
ness’ of quantum theory. One might query: “Surely, by definition, a theory of
quantified ignorance is necessarily incomplete?”. Yes, but if something is nec-
essarily incomplete then why attempt to complete it? And, why care that such
a completion should behave nicely if one does? One can never complete our
two-sub-urns experiment because it tells us everything it can and any natural
completion requires a change in the very predictions that we make (making the
urns transparent say). Therefore it is the best physical description we can ever
get while making the same predictions, hence it is natural to call it a ‘complete’
description of an unknown realistic configuration. If a theory cannot be ratio-
nally completed while retaining its predictions then it is either ‘complete’ or
makes the wrong predictions. Therefore we do not reject the idea that a new
theory might come about that will supersede quantum theory—we only reject,
like Bell, that any natural completion of quantum theory cannot obey Bell lo-
cality. This is not necessarily in conflict with quantum theory being ‘complete’
(in the same sense that our two-sub-urn predictions are ‘complete’ in a Bayesian
interpretation) nor with it being entirely consistent with special relativity and
the free choice of observers—this is clear by analogy with our Bayesian two-
sub-urns example; a simple ‘complete’ description of an unknown configuration
of realistic balls. A complete description of a known configuration of realistic
balls is a whole different kettle of fish and a complete description of an unknown
configuration is simply a misnomer. In order to tentatively deny any conflicts
between special relativity and quantum mechanics one would probably have to
use something akin to Bayesian probability. One can refuse to take this path if
it is not aesthetically pleasing to you, but one should not, yet, deny its existence.
Just as Eq.(3) “may not embody your notion of local causality” [22], neither
might our notion of ‘completeness’ embody your notion. At present, there is
sufficient ambiguity implicit in foundational notions of probability—and in all
the other dubious words we use—to justify either deep truth: ‘nonlocality’ or
‘completeness’.
One might then, na¨ıvely, ask whether such outcome dependent experiments
can emulate the correlations we get in quantum theory. But, of course, if we
allow outcome dependence then we cannot even derive Bell’s inequalities. So the
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more pertinent question is, can such outcome dependent experiments emulate
the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory? Quantum theory is itself an
outcome dependent theory so the possibility remains that—since quantum the-
ory is itself a theory we use to predict the probabilities of unknown variables—
quantum theory is its own ‘completion’. We don’t claim this view is new; it
was, for example, hinted at by Jaynes in [23]—although in a rather contentious
manner which is easily criticised [24]. Such a proposal is obviously analogous
to stating that quantum theory is just a novel probability theory [25, 26].
Obviously, we do not claim that we can emulate quantum theory using such
urns and balls; rather we argue only that accepting outcome dependence can be
completely compatible with special relativistic causality and the free choice of
observers is not an escape route that has been exhaustively proved wanting.
Such a proposal is akin to the standard way that most try to get around
Bell’s theorem—one denies the hidden variable hypothesis. But, as we argue
here, when denying the hidden variable hypothesis one need not deny all forms
of realism. When interpreted in a Bayesian fashion, certain simple urn ex-
periments use a form of realism distinct from the realism used when invoking
hidden variables—such experiments are still naturally considered eminently re-
alistic. Such realistic experiments also require outcome dependence in a manner
that is not necessarily in any conflict with special relativity. In our two-sub-
urns example one might try to say that outcome dependence is, in this case,
not incompatible with local causality because we can design a local hidden vari-
able theory, but such a claim is rather dubious. In quantum theory outcome
dependence might be compatible with local causality in a manner distinct from
the manner in which our two-sub-urns example is—quantum theory simply isn’t
classical probability theory. So perhaps quantum theory is a realistic outcome
dependent theory where the specification of hidden variables in the theory is a
physically dubious assumption—and not just philosophically unappealing—just
as background dependence is physically dubious because it is not rationally jus-
tified. We call it ‘physically dubious’ because it takes the form of a necessary
constraint upon how we are allowed to consistently represent certain variables
in physical theories.
So, such an analysis is not a rejection of realism per se, it is rather just an
acceptance of a certain realism above and beyond the na¨ıve kind used when
discussing hidden variables. One is not to interpret the term ‘na¨ıve’ in any
derogatory fashion. This is, after all, exactly what Bell profoundly proved;
that we cannot use such notions when discussing quantum theory, hence their
na¨ıvety—the domain of his discussion is clearly stated. So, lets not search for a
completion of the theory (Bell tells us it is nonlocal and by the above argument
such a task is not rationally justified) but rather lets search for a locally causal
‘complete’ theory—‘complete’ in the sense that the state represents everything
we can rationally justify that we know about the system and apparatus. Bell’s
work is the first step one must take in such a search; one must reject a wide
class of intuitive theories. (Or, in opposition to this tentative view, one must
search for a proof that quantum theory contains causal nonlocalities.) The
beauty of Bell’s work is that such a first step could be taken by experimental
verification. Unfortunately we do not have the genius to propose a way to
experimentally verify the second conceptual shift we have just invoked—using
Bayesian probability theory. Nethertheless, such a conceptual shift is perhaps
warranted by the aesthetics of such an approach.
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Having recognised the domain of Bell’s work, many authors have attempted
to extend and generalise the discussion without having to use the probabilistic
assumptions that Bell used. Some good examples are the exciting programmes
started by Hardy [27] and Stapp [28]. Stapp’s programme, for example, is in
opposition to the tentative view given above; it is an attempt to prove that
causal nonlocalities are necessarily required by quantum theory. Stapp’s work,
however, has recently been criticised by Shimony [29]. We argued above that,
because of outcome dependence, probabilities are not well-defined independently
of events in space-like separated regions—they are manifestly defined with re-
spect to such regions. (Note the distinction between a probability that is well-
defined due to an ignorance of spacelike separated events and a probability that
is independent of knowledge of events at spacelike separated events; the latter
is ill-defined.) Similarly, Shimony argues that the counterfactual statements
that Stapp invokes are also not well-defined independently of space-like sepa-
rated regions—counterfactual statements are manifestly defined relative to such
regions. Such interdependencies between the very definitions of certain proba-
bilities or between the very definitions of certain counterfactual statements may
be interpreted in an entirely logical manner—thus we need not necessarily in-
voke nonlocal causal relations to explain them. Thus it is not yet clear that
such programmes prove that causal nonlocalities are necessarily a component of
quantum theory. Of course, all this relates to the perennial debate started by
the conflict between the EPR paper [30] and Bohr’s response [31]. All we argue
here is the debate is not concluded.
Depending on your personal views on the foundations of probability one
may or may not take to the above treatise for the use of Bayesian probability
in physics. Recently a spate of work has been written with such a Bayesian
commitment. Essential highlights are [2, 6, 7, 8, 32]. If, after reading such
work, one does not accept the Bayesian view then one might also wish to take
note of the recent discussion of Bell’s inequalities by Khrennikov [33] written
specifically in terms of von Mises’ relative frequency approach [34].
Bayesian probabilities are invoked as subjective degrees of belief—but this
is not incompatible with realism (also see [35]). When all observers agree upon
probability assignments then the probabilities are intersubjectively defined—
which is, in turn, as close to objectivity as we ever get. In order to find such
intersubjective probabilities we would have to discuss a subset of all the prob-
abilities invoked by applying some kind of constraint—perhaps something akin
to exchangability of sequences of experimental results. Depending upon the
constraint required one might be able to invoke a locally causal hidden vari-
able model of such intersubjective probabilities—the most obvious constraint is
outcome independence itself, so one, perhaps, doesn’t have to do much work!
However, quantum theory can describe more than just these intersubjectively
defined probabilities.
Bayesian Histories
So, we argue that there are good reasons of making quantum theory explicitly
a Bayesian theory. We have recently suggested two possible ways this could
be done while using a history formulation of quantum theory. Firstly we have
argued [5] that the Linearly Positive formalism of Goldstein and Page [17] is
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explicitly compatible with Cox’s Bayesian axioms of probability and secondly we
have argued that a more general complex probability assignment justified using
Cox’s axioms also makes quite a lot of sense [4]. If one could find a constructive
uniqueness proof for these Bayesian probability assignments we would be one
step closer to a quantum gravity theory. We would then have a derivation of
Bayesian probabilities from a propositional algebra with quantum properties.
The next step would be to invoke an analogous generally covariant ‘histories’
or ‘spacetimes’ algebra and an analogous construction of Bayesian assignments.
Perhaps a covariant propositional algebra should involve whole spacetimes or
causal sets rather than histories per se. General covariance is only justified as a
criteria of rationality in discussing cosmological situations i.e. whole spacetimes.
General covariance has a trivial symmetry group [12]. When not discussing
cosmological situations boundary conditions ensure that non-trivial symmetries
should be invoked. Such a non-cosmological theory should still be as background
independent as the boundary conditions allow (we should not base inferences on
any background structures except the boundary conditions themselves). This is
something that is explicitly acknowledged in Hardy’s framework too [13].
One might reject the use of Bayesian probabilities in cosmological situations
because there are no observers ‘outside’ the universe that we can invoke, but this
is simply a misnomer. Bayesian probability is widely used in the astrophysics
community for example.
Conclusion
So, we argue, there are good reasons for invoking Bayesian probabilities in quan-
tum theory. Interpreting quantum theory in a Bayesian manner explicitly stops
us from necessarily having to invoke nonlocality, and Bayesian assignments seem
to appear quite naturally within the quantum histories formalism—of course the
histories algebra is not generally covariant and nor have we yet proved that our
suggested Bayesian assignments are unique; but, arguably, the primary reason
many physicists have invoked history theories is that it seems to be one step
closer to a covariant formulation [11, 16, 36, 37]. Some even suggest that quan-
tum theory is just a novel probability theory that may be derivable from simple
plausible premises [35, 25]. If this is the case then the most natural programme
for quantum gravity is just to apply this novel probability theory to a generally
covariant propositional algebra. Again, this is far easier said than done. First
we need to justify a generally covariant propositional algebra (this would in-
corporate the kinematics and dynamics of the theory). Hardy [13] has recently
suggested a tentative mathematical framework in which such a theory could be
defined—although Hardy doesn’t explicitly use Bayesian probabilities (he does
however use Bayes’ formula), it seems that a notion of probability based around
criteria of rationality might be exactly what we need for a relational quantum
gravity.
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